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"SECONDARY EFFECTS" ANALYSIS: A BALANCED
APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF PROHIBITIONS ON
AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING
The streets of Baltimore, like those of other metropolitan areas
across the country, have been besieged by a growing number of
homeless people in recent years.' In response to the dangers posed
by "aggressive panhandlers" to the city's social and economic well-
being, the Baltimore City Council enacted Ordinance 275, the city's
"Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance. ' 2 Following the enactment of
1. Other such cities include: Austin, Tx.; Buffalo, N.Y.; New York City, N.Y.;
San Francisco, Ca.; Los Angeles, Ca.; and Miami, Fl. See Robert Teir,
Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional Approach
to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REv. 285 (1993).
According to a report prepared for Baltimore Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke by
the Downtown Partnership, the number of homeless individuals on the street
on any given night in the city of Baltimore is estimated to be approximately
2,400. See DOWNTOWN SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT, A PRnscRIPION FOR
PUBLIC SAFETY: A REPORT TO MAYOR KURT L. ScHmoKE, at 11 (Nov. 1991)
[hereinafter SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT]. According to the 1990 census, the
city of Baltimore has 750,000 residents.
2. BALTIMORE, MD., CODE art. 19, § 249 (Supp. 1994) (enacted Dec. 22, 1993)
[hereinafter "Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance"]. The "Aggressive Panhan-
dling Ordinance" provides:
(b)(1) "Panhandling" means any act by which one person asks, begs
or solicits alms from another or others in person, by requesting an
immediate donation of money or other thing of value.
(b)(2) "Aggressive panhandling" means panhandling which is accom-
panied by one or more of the following:
(i) approaching, speaking to, or following a person in such a manner
as would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm or the
commission of a criminal act upon the person, or upon property in
the person's immediate possession;
(ii) touching another person in the course of panhandling without
that person's consent;
(iii) continuously panhandling from a person, or following the per-
son, after the person has made a negative response;
(iv) intentionally blocking or interfering with the safe passage of a
person or a vehicle by any means, including unreasonably causing a
person to take evasive action to avoid physical contact;
(v) using obscene pr abusive language following refusal;
(vi) acting with the intent of intimidating another person into giving
money or another thing of value.
(d) It is unlawful for any person to engage in panhandling:
(I) within ten feet of any automatic teller machine (ATM);
(2) in any public transportation vehicle or at any bus, train, light
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this ordinance, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed suit
on behalf of three homeless individuals3 in federal district court,
challenging the ordinance's constitutionality on First and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds and seeking an injunction to prevent the city
from enforcing the ordinance. 4 The suit alleged that Baltimore City
Police Officers systematically harassed homeless individuals and
threatened them with arrest and that the ordinance was enacted to
serve as the cornerstone of a coordinated effort by city officials to
drive the homeless from the downtown area.5 In ruling on the city's
rail, or subway station or stop;
(3) on private property or residential property if the owner, tenant
or occupant has asked the person not to panhandle on the property,
or has posted a sign on the property indicating soliciting or panhan-
dling;
(4) from any operator or occupant of a motor vehicle that is in
traffic on a public street, whether in exchange for cleaning the vehicles
windows or otherwise; or
(5) from any operator or occupant of a motor vehicle on a public
street in exchange for reserving a public parking space or directing
the occupant to a public parking space.
(e) Penalties. Any person who violates the provisions of this section
is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than one hundred dollars ($100) or imprisoned for
not more than thirty days, or both, or if the person has been convicted
of a violation of this section within the previous year, the person
shall be fined not more than two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) or
imprisoned for not more than ninety days, or both.
The Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance was held unconstitutional in Patton v.
City of Baltimore, Civil No. S 93-2389 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 1994) (Memorandum
Opinion on Motions and Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment).
3. Tico Patton, Ricardo Maddox, and Bernard Williams, the named plaintiffs in
the action, all testified cat their respective depositions that they had frequently
experienced problems with both Baltimore City Police Officers and public
safety guides. Patton and Maddox also indicated that they had been instructed
to move along and to cease panhandling on numerous occasions and that they
had also witnessed other panhandlers being instructed in a similar manner. See
Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 20, 22.
4. The lawsuit also named Baltimore's Downtown Partnership as a defendant and
challenged the "move along" policy employed by the Partnership's hired
"safety guides," alleging that the policy was used to systematically harass,
threaten, and intimidate homeless individuals engaged in harmless, innocent
conduct at the Inner Harbor and other places in the heart of the city's
commercial downtown area.
The Downtown Partnership's official policy regarding homeless individuals
and aggressive panhandlers is contained in a written policy statement issued
after the litigation in Patton. "That Policy provides that the Partnership's
safety guides are only to interfere with the activities of homeless persons if:
(1) they are obstructing pedestrian or vehicular access to sidewalks, streets or
business premises; (2) they are engaging in illegal activity; or (3) they are
engaging in behavior that is abusive or intimidating." Id. at 9-10.
5. Id. at 11-12.
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motion for summary judgment, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland concluded that the Aggressive Panhandling
Ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because its prohibitions targeted only the homeless and
panhandlers. This ruling has sent the city back to the drawing board
in its attempt to draft legislation that strikes the appropriate balance
between the needs of the homeless to solicit donations and the health,
welfare, and public safety concerns implicated by aggressive panhan-
dling.
This Comment first discusses the magnitude of the aggressive
panhandling problem facing the city. This Comment then analyzes
the current state of the law by examining the problems confronted
by other cities that have attempted to restrict panhandling in a
manner consistent with the demands of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Finally, this Comment examines alternative approaches
to the problems associated with drafting aggressive panhandling
ordinances and suggests a course of action that the city of Baltimore
should consider when redrafting the ordinance to reach a constitu-
tional result.
I. THE PROBLEM OF AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING
A. The Extent of the Problem
The citizens of Baltimore are confronted with beggars on an
almost daily basis. A simple journey into the city, especially the
downtown area, will inevitably result in at least one, if not several,
interactions with homeless persons requesting money. Some of these
individuals solicit in a passive and peaceful manner, usually either
by holding a sign or cup. Others, however, use more aggressive
tactics, such as coercion or intimidation, or choose to beg in locations
where such solicitations are especially intimidating, such as at ATMs
or near cars stopped in traffic.7 On any given night, there are
approximately 2,400 homeless individuals on the streets of Baltimore
and only 1,200 beds available in the city's fifty-three shelters.' This
housing shortage is accompanied by food shortages and by the
6. Id. at 55, 65-67.
7. It is essential that the scope of the problem be properly delineated: "The
problem is not the man who forgot to bring enough change for the bus ...
[or] the person who is really down and out on [his or] her luck, appealing to
our sense of charity ... in an unobtrusive manner." Teir, supra note 1, at
288. Rather, the problem is aggressive panhandling and the numerous and very
real social harms closely associated with it. Id.
8. Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 3 (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 11-
12).
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absence of adequate health and emergency services. 9 Although the
city's growing homeless population is a tragic and unfortunate state-
ment about the quality of modern urban life, it must be balanced
against, and viewed in light of, the. city's need and obligation to
provide a "safe, clean, and aesthetically pleasing environment for its
residents and visitors."' 0 As with other threats to public safety and
welfare, the city should be allowed to target the source of the threat
and should subject it to constitutionally permissible regulation. Ag-
gressive panhandling poses a threat to two interrelated interests: first,
the continued vitality and growth of the city community; and, second,
the safety and welfare of the public and of those who panhandle.
1. The Threat to Community Growth and Vitality
The problem of aggressive panhandling strikes at the community
bond that holds a metropolitan area together. Increased numbers of
aggressive panhandlers on city streets and in and around other public
places-parks, tourist attractions, and entertainment venues, for ex-
ample-contribute to the perception that the city is unsafe, unclean,
and altogether unpleasant. Aggressive panhandling, and other con-
duct of the homeless, has been identified as a source of public anxiety
for citizens, merchants, tourists, and individuals employed in Balti-
more. "
As the experiences of other cities aptly demonstrate, when public
areas that are designated for recreation, enjoyment, and community
interaction suddenly become areas of frequent intimidation and in-
trusion, they quickly become areas that are shunned by the general
public. City residents go elsewhere to shop or spend the day. Tourists
become aware of the problem, avoid the city during vacation time,
and take their dollars, needed by the city, somewhere else where the
tourists can feel safe. Eventually, city residents reach their tolerance
threshold and abandon the city for the safe haven of the suburbs.
Baltimore can hardly afford either. The city only recently completed
its revitalization of the Inner Harbor area of downtown 2 and, no
9. Id. at 3 (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 12).
10. Id. at 2.
11. See id. at 5 (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 11).
12. "What thirty years ago was a collection of decaying docks, empty sheds, and
unsightly parking lots surrounding a debris-filled river has become the city's
symbolic centerpiece, attracting millions of people a year." Brian Kelley &
Roger K. Lewis, What's Right and Wrong About Inner Harbor: A 1990s Take
On Baltimore's Massive Downtown Revitalization Project, 58 PLANNING, Apr.
1992, at 28. This project began in the 1950s through the cooperative efforts
of business and political leaders armed with state and federal funding. Vincent
& Ann Magnotta, Baltimore A wakens to a Municipal Renaissance, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 8, 1981, at 10. The first phase began with the
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doubt, would like to continue this process city-wide. It has also only
recently begun to rehabilitate its reputation as a major mid-Atlantic
commercial center and as a national tourist attraction. 3 The major
gains of the recent past will be jeopardized should the city find itself
powerless to address the problem of aggressive panhandling.
2. The Threat to Public Safety
Aggressive panhandling strikes fear into the hearts of individual
citizens who have to deal with it on a daily basis. The fear created
by panhandlers is not the product of irrationality, nor is it a knee-
jerk reaction to the growing numbers of homeless beggars on city
streets.' 4 The fear is often the product of the more coercive and
intimidating conduct of panhandlers who aggressively solicit dona-
tions and is precisely the type of public safety concern that the city's
Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance is designed to address."
construction of Charles Center, a $1.75 million central business core, 33 acre
complex containing 1.75 million square feet of office space, 400 apartments,
shops, restaurants, underground parking for 4,000 vehicles, and a five-tower
Hilton Hotel. Id. This phase was completed in 1963. Id.
The second phase of revitalization began in 1964 with the construction of
Harborplace, a project of James W. Rouse which contains numerous specialty
shops and restaurants. Id. Construction began in the same year on the Inner
Harbor project, a 240-acre complex adjoining Charles Center and hugging the
waterfront. This project included the thirty-story World Trade Center with
observation deck, a new federal courthouse, the Maryland Academy of Science
Exhibition Center and Museum, with planetarium, and several office buildings.
Id. The Inner Harbor officially opened on July 2, 1980. Jane Seaberry, Harbor
Center Opens; Baltimore Opens Its Harborplace, WASH. POST, July 2, 1980,
at El.
The final phase of the revitalization was completed with the addition of a
$15 million aquarium, completed in 1981, and the construction of Oriole Park
at Camden Yards, a baseball facility serving as the site of Baltimore Orioles
home games, completed in 1992. Id.
13. Baltimore's main tourist attractions include: Oriole Park at Camden Yards,
home of the Baltimore Orioles baseball franchise; the Inner Harbor, including
the National Aquarium, Harborplace, the U.S.F. Constellation, and the Pier
Six Concert Pavilion; the Star Spangled Banner Flag House; and Babe Ruth's
Birthplace and Museum. See Eve Zibart, In and Around the Ballpark, WASH.
POST, Apr. 3, 1992, at N6; Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 2-3.
14. Teir, supra note 1, at 289; id. at n.12 (citing Loper v. New York City Police
Dep't, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that begging's effects range from
"mere annoyance and inconvenience to genuine terror")).
15. The experiences of other cities indicate that threats and instances of violence
have become inseparable components of begging. Indeed "aggressive panhan-
dling" implies some kind of forceful approach or conduct beyond the ordinary
request for a solicitation from a stranger; unfortunately, this extraordinary
conduct often takes the form of violence or threats of violence. See Begging
Off: Humane Ways to Set Limits, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1990, at 68.
19951
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In addition to the intimidation of the individual through face-
to-face encounters, aggressive panhandling is part of a more threat-
ening social phenomenon: the perpetual cycle of decay that draws
more serious criminal activity into a neighborhood or area.16 A city's
lack of effective deterrence may not only encourage panhandlers to
become more aggressive but may also encourage increasingly aggres-
sive criminal and predatory conduct by the criminal element. Once
entrenched, these secondary effects of aggressive panhandling cannot
be eliminated easily and can serve to hasten the overall decay of the
entire community. This is a prospect that Baltimore simply cannot
afford.
Finally, an often overlooked but no less important concern is
the protection of those who panhandle. After all, homeless panhan-
dlers are citizens, and the city is responsible for the public safety of
all its inhabitants. Often, the most effective way to protect homeless
panhandlers is to prohibit them from panhandling in certain places
at certain times, regardless of the manner used to panhandle.17 Such
prevention was precisely what the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance
sought to accomplish. 8
II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PROHIBITIONS ON
BEGGING
Prohibitions and restraints on begging and panhandling have
existed for several hundred years, both in Europe19 and in the United
16. This phenomenon is often described as the "Broken Windows" effect. The
"Broken Windows" effect is a phrase coined by Professors James Q. Wilson
and George Kelling, who, following a study of the effects of all varieties of
disorderly behavior (including begging) on neighborhoods, concluded that
[j]ust as unrepaired broken windows in buildings may signal that
nobody cares and lead to additional vandalism and damage, so un-
tended disorderly behavior may also communicate that nobody cares
(or that nobody can or will do anything about the disorder) and thus
lead to increasingly aggressive criminal and dangerous predatory be-
havior.
Teir, supra note 1, at 290 (quoting George L. Kelling, Acquiring a Taste for
Order: The Community and Police, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 90, 92 (1987)); id. at
290 n.19 (citing Loper, 802 F. Supp. 1029, 1034-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (noting
that "[r]eality and everyday experience confirm the 'Broken Windows' effect"),
aff'd, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993)).
17. For example, the individual who panhandles places himself or herself in danger
of serious bodily injury on busy streets and at intersections during rush hour.
Accompanying this threat of injury is the fact that the individuals solicited are
a captive audience-they are unable to avoid or escape the unwanted solicita-
tion. Under these circumstances, the inherently coercive and intimidating effect
of the solicitation is greatly magnified.
18. See Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance § a.
19. Teir, supra note 1, at 294 n.29 (citing Plato, Tim LAWS, 11.90 (ordering that
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States. 20 Although society's norms and attitudes changed during this
time, the negative perception of begging has remained relatively
constant. 21 The purposes of anti-begging laws, however, have under-
gone a continuous evolution throughout this country's history.
Consistent with its English heritage, 22 the United States first
attempted to control vagrants and beggars by denying them all
beggars be ostracized from the Market)); id. at 295 n.34 (citing Statute of
Laborers, 23 Edw. 3, St. 1, ch. 7 (1349) (prescribing the death penalty for
anyone in England who gave anything to an able-bodied beggar)); id. at 296
n.39 (citing 1 Edw. 6, ch. 3 (1547) (providing that a beggar who refused to
work be branded with a "V" for vagabond and be enslaved)); id. (citing 14
Eliz. Ch. 5 (1572) (requiring that all beggars be "grievously whipped and
burned through the gristle of the right ear" for a first offense and punished
by death for a second offense)); id. at 297 (citing 39 Eliz. Ch. 4 (1597)
(requiring counties to build houses of correction to hold "rogues, vagabonds,
and sturdy beggars" until they were put to work or banished)); id (citing 17
Geo. 2, ch. 5 (1744) (dividing beggars into different classes and prescribing
different terms of incarceration, ranging from six months to two years, for
each class)).
20. Id. at 301 n.79, MAss. ST. 1788, ch. 21 (retaining the same classifications used
in English statutes prohibiting begging, and utilizing the same classification
scheme as English statute).
21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 437-44 (1941) (repealed 1977) (including "common
drunkards" in list of vagrants and excluding idleness resulting from strikes or
lockouts as conditions of vagrancy); Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-991(1) (1956)
(repealed 1977) (defining "idlers who are not Indians" as vagrants); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 881 (1953) (repealed 1958) (describing idle wanderers as
"tramps" and adding "all persons roaming about the country, commonly
known as gypsies" to list of persons classified as vagrants); FLA. STAT. ch.
856.02 (1957) (repealed 1972) (condemning persons using juggling or unlawful
games or plays); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-7101 (1953) (repealed 1968) (deeming
persons found in possession of weapons or instruments with the intent to
commit a crime as "rouges and vagabonds"); HAW. REv. STAT. § 314-1 (1955)
(amended by HAw. REV. STAT. § 711-1101(l)(e) (1978)) (defining as vagrants
"persons who practice hoopiopio, hoounauna, hoomanamana, anaana, or
pretend to have the power of praying persons to death"); IND. CODE ANN. §
10-4603 (Burns 1956) (repealed 1976) (designating trespassers armed in buildings
or threatening injury to the person or property of occupants of land or buildings
as "tramps"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 53 (West 1956) (amended
1973) (revising Elizabethan statute of 1788 by deleting references to rogues,
vagabonds, jugglers, or common pipers and fiddlers); MICH. ComP. LAWS §
750.167 (1948) (amended 1956) (defining "window peepers" as vagrants); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 207.030(lOB) (1957) (defining "frequenters of law dens" as
vagrants) (amended 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1141(4) (West 1958)
(repealed 1974) (defining "persons who act as callers of figures for dances in
houses of ill fame" as vagrants); VA. CODE ANN. § 63-338, (Michie 1950)
(repealed 1968) (defining nine classes of persons as vagrants, including "persons
wandering or strolling about in idleness; persons from without the state found
loitering within it with no visible occupation or means of subsistence and who
are unable to give a reasonable account of themselves").
22. The English experience with begging and panhandling was filled with contra-
19951
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rights. 23 The Constitution of 1787 contained no exemption; it left the
control of vagrants and beggars up to the states. 24 The states readily
accepted this responsibility 2 and enacted a variety of vagrancy laws
that typically contained a specific prohibition on begging and pan-
handling .26
Until the "Due Process Revolution" of the 1960s, most courts
upheld vagrancy statutes and their broad prohibitions on begging
and panhandling. 27 The statutes were justified by the view that
diction. English laws addressing begging alternated between Draconian measures
prescribing severe penalties, including death, and elaborate statutes differenti-
ating between physically disabled persons who had to beg to survive and able-
bodied persons who simply chose to beg rather than work. This alternating
pattern persisted for several centuries and formed the basis for modern vagrancy
laws in the United States. Teir, supra note 1, at 295-98; id. at 23 (citing JMEs
F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRmINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883) (addressing
in great detail the various English approaches to criminalizing and punishing
begging and vagrancy)); supra note 19.
23. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation stated:
"The free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
free citizens in the several States . . . ." Teir, supra note 1, at 300 n.77 (quoting
the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, ART. IV (1781) (emphasis added)).
24. It is black-letter constitutional law that where the Constitution is silent on an
issue, the states have control. Norris v. City of Boston, 48 U.S. 283, 289
(1849).
25. Teir, supra note 1, at 300 (stating that "[bly 1956, vagrancy statutes were in
force in every state except West Virginia, where it was a common law crime");
see also id. at 300 n.78 (citing Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 609 (1956)); supra note 21.
26. Teir, supra note 1, at 301 n.84 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c) (West 1988
& Supp. 1995) (punishing "[every beggar who solicits alms as a business");
id. at 302 n.89 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4108(e) (1988) (repealed 1992)
(prohibiting "deriving support in whole or in part from begging")); id. at 302
n.96 (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:107(3) (West 1986 & Supp. 1995)
(repealed 1992) (retaining the distinction between able-bodied and disabled
beggars)); BALT. CITY, MD., CODE OF PUBLIC LAWS art. 4, § 24-2 (1980)
(repealed 1994); id. at 302 nn.90-91 (citing MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272,
§§ 63, 66 (West 1990) (including beggars in the definition of "tramps" and
''vagrants")).
27. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1299 (Ariz. 1975) (holding that
statute prohibiting loitering or prowling upon the private property of another,
without the consent of or lawful business with the owner or occupant thereof,
was not unconstitutionally vague); In re Cregler, 363 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1961)
(upholding constitutionality of vagrancy statute prohibiting persons having no
visible or lawful means of support from loitering around railroad depot and
other designated places or public gathering or assembly); Williams v. District
of Columbia, 65 A.2d 924 (D.C. 1949); Johnson v. State, 202 So. 2d 852 (Fla.
1967) (upholding vagrancy statute prohibiting persons from "wandering or
strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object
... "); Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City, Worcester County,
236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964) (upholding constitutionality of city curfew
[Vol. 24
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vagrancy was a "parasitic disease, which, if allowed to spread,
w[ould] sap the life out of that upon which it fe[d]." ' 28 Modern
courts have been inclined to reject this rationale29 and have struck
down several broad vagrancy statutes. 30 The loss of these broad
prohibitions deprived the states of a powerful and effective weapon
against begging. Consequently, in the face of the growing number
of homeless and a reduced amount of revenue and financial resources,
the states have had to find effective alternative methods by which to
combat begging and panhandling. Many states have simply delegated
legislative authority to cities and municipalities to promulgate regu-
lations on begging, effectively "washing their hands" of the entire
problem.3 Thus, the current efforts of Baltimore and other cities in
regulating or restricting begging are merely the latest in a long line
of anti-begging measures stretching back into antiquity.
III. EXPERIENCE IS THE BEST TEACHER: HOW OTHER
CITIES HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DRAFT LAWS PROHIBITING
PANHANDLING
The City of Baltimore can consult statutory schemes enacted by
other cities when it attempts to correct the constitutional infirmities
ordinance); Martin v. State, 203 Md. 66, 98 A.2d 8 (1953) (upholding statute
declaring "every person apprehended having upon him any picklock . . .crow,
jack, or other implement, at places and under circumstances from which intent
[to break and enter] may be presumed ... shall be declared a vagabond");
Bevans v. State, 180 Md. 443, 24 A.2d 792 (1942) (same); Tinsley v. City of
Richmond, 119 S.E.2d 488 (Va. 1961) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting
loitering on streets or sidewalks by persons requested to move by police was
valid exercise of police power and not unlawful delegation of legislative power);
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 191 S.E. 791 (1937) (upholding statute defining
"vagrant" as "persons who have no visible income lawfully acquired and who
consort with idlers, gamblers, and the like..."); State v. Harlowe, 24 P.2d
601 (Wash. 1933).
28. Tier, supra note 1, at 301 n.86.
29. See, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941).
30. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding that
Florida's vagrancy ordinance violated the requirements of due process because
it was unconstitutionally overbroad); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
(holding that a California loitering statute punishing the failure by any person
wandering the streets to produce credible identification when requested to do
so by a police officer was too vague to satisfy the requirements of due process).
31. Eleven states currently authorize municipalities to deal with the problem of
begging. Teir, supra note 1, at 302 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-1408
(Michie 1987); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 24, para. 11-5-4 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 7-32-4304 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 15-257 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:17 (1991 & Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-179 (1994); N.D. Cent.
Code § 40-05-01(43) (1993 & Supp. 1991) (amended 1993); OIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 715.55B (Baldwin 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-51 (1992 & Supp.
1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 35.22.280(34) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995);
WYo. STAT. § 15-1-103 (a)(xvii) (1992 & Supp. 1995)); see also infra note 35.
of its Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance brought to light in Patton
v. City of Baltimore.32 It may be difficult for Baltimore to glean
clear guiding principles from the court decisions that have interpreted
the schemes used by other states, however, because those schemes
vary widely in their essential elements. Generally, cities and munici-
palities addressing the issue of panhandling have chosen one of three
distinct enforcement options. Some have enacted "blanket bans,"
which prohibit all panhandling." Others have enacted bans on all
panhandling in specific areas.14 Finally, still others have banned all
"aggressive panhandling" by focusing on specific harmful, threat-
ening, or intimidating conduct associated with panhandling." This
Comment examines the successes and failures of the various chal-
lenges to some of these statutes and ordinances in order to determine
the ability of Baltimore's Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance to with-
stand similar challenges. The experience of other cities provides
valuable information that will help Baltimore to formulate a solution
that balances the city's interest in public safety and economic growth
with the individual freedoms of beggars and panhandlers.
A. The Constitutionally Unsure Footing of "Blanket Bans" on
Begging
By far, the most constitutionally dangerous position for a city
or municipality to take is the complete ban on all begging. Cities
32. See infra note 35.
33. These "blanket ban" cities include: Austin, Tx.; Buffalo, N.Y.; Chicago, Ill.;
Fort Wayne, Ind.; Mobile, Ala.; San Francisco, Ca.; Miami, Fla.; Phoenix,
Az.; and Newport News, Va. See Teir, supra note 1, at 303.
34. These cities include: Albuquerque, N.M. (in public view); El Paso, Tx. (in
vehicles stopped at traffic lights); Indianapolis, Ind. (in public streets and
parks); New York City, N.Y. (in subways and airports); and San Antonio, Tx.
(in airports). See Tier, supra note 1, at 303 n.102.
35. See DALLAS, TEX., CITY CODE §§ 31-35 (1991) (prohibiting "solicitation by
coercion . . .including persist[ence] in a solicitation after the person solicited
has given a negative response"); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3311, 3312 (1993)
(prohibiting begging in an aggressive manner on public or private property);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CHARTER & CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 15 § 385.65 (1988)
(prohibiting "[any] person, in any public place ... from follow[ing] or
engag[ing] in conduct which reasonably tends to arouse alarm or anger in
others . . .or [to] block passage by another person or vehicle [or] to require
another person or a driver ... to take evasive action to avoid physical
contact"); PORTLAND, OR., MUN. CODE § 14.24.040(a)(1987) (prohibiting "of-
fensive physical contact ... and caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause another
person reasonably [to] apprehend that they will be subjected to any offensive
physical contact, either to their person or to personal property in their im-
mediate possession"); SEATTLE, WASH., MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015B (1987)
(prohibiting aggressively begging and "obstruct[ing] pedestrian or vehicular
traffic" and defining "aggressive begging" as "begging with intent to intimidate
another person into giving money or goods").
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adopting this approach make the calculated gamble that begging is
not speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Once
a court finds that an individual's freedom of speech in a public
forum has been implicated by government action, the proscribing
statute or ordinance is viewed as presumptively unconstitutional and
is only upheld if it can withstand the strictest of judicial scrutiny.16
In addition, absolute bans on begging tend to run afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment's mandate that all persons similarly situated
be treated alike." It is very difficult for a city or municipality to
rationalize the distinction between beggars and solicitors for charities
and non-profit organizations when identical conduct brings citation,
arrest, and possibly incarceration to one and absolutely no penalty
to the other.
In Loper v. New York City Police Department,3 8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the con-
stitutionality of a New York statute prohibiting all begging in a
public place.3 9 The plaintiffs, Jennifer Loper and William Kaye, filed
suit against the New York City Police Department, in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking
to enjoin the enforcement of the statute.4 The district court concluded
that the statute violated the First Amendment freedom of speech and
entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 41 The Second Circuit
36. The strict scrutiny test is employed only when governmental action impinges
upon the exercise of a right explicitly or implicitly granted by the Constitution
or creates a classification among citizens, like race for example, that is
inherently suspect. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(indicating that race is a suspect criterion for legislative classifications). Anti-
begging ordinances could conceivably trigger a strict scrutiny analysis on both
First Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. Once a court concludes that
begging is speech protected by the First Amendment, and is therefore within
the fundamental right of free speech, the appropriate level of analysis is strict
scrutiny. Where strict scrutiny is invoked, the classification will be upheld only
if it is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny test
to statute burdening fundamental right to travel), overruled in part by Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192
(1964) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based classification).
37. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982).
38. 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993).
39. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (McKinney 1989) provides, in relevant part:
A person is guilty of loitering when he:
1. Loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the
purpose of begging[.J
40. Loper, 999 F.2d at 701.
41. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
aff'd, 999 F.2d 699, 701 (2d Cir. 1993). At first blush, Loper appears to
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affirmed and, in support of this conclusion, noted that although the
Supreme Court of the United States had not squarely addressed the
issue of whether begging was speech protected by the First Amend-
ment, the Court had decided cases involving public solicitations and
fund raisers for charities. 42 Relying on Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment 3 and its progeny, the Second
Circuit concluded that solicitation was a form of constitutionally
protected speech because it saw no principled distinction between
individuals soliciting for organized charities and individuals soliciting
for themselves with regard to the message conveyed."
Having determined that the challenged statute prohibited consti-
tutionally protected speech on public streets, a traditional public
forum,' 5 the court subjected the statute to strict scrutiny. 46 The court
examined whether the statute necessarily served a compelling state
interest and whether it was narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
47
indicate a startling about-face by the Second Circuit on the issue of begging
as constitutionally protected speech, given its decision in Young v. New York
Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990). In
Young, the court held that begging did not convey any recognizable message
deserving First Amendment protection. Id. However, given that it had already
prohibited all begging on New York's subway system in Young, the Second
Circuit probably concluded that upholding the outright ban in all public areas
in Loper would leave beggars without anywhere to beg. Loper, 999 F.2d at
699. The absence of clear Supreme Court precedent on the issue of where
begging fits, if at all, in the scheme of the First Amendment, contributed to
the Loper court's ultimate decision. Id.
42. Id. at 701, 703-04 (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781
(1988); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947
(1984); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620
(1980)).
In Village of Schaumburg, the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting
solicitation by charitable organizations that did not use at least 75% of their
revenues for charitable purposes, explicitly holding that "charitable appeals
for funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests-
communication of information, the dissemination ... [of] ideas, and the
advocacy of causes-that are within the protection of the First Amendment
." Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632.
43. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
44. Loper, 999 F.2d at 703-04. The court concluded that begging was protected
speech because it usually involved the communication of a particularized social
and political message, and was "accompanied by speech indicating the [beg-
gar's] need for food, shelter, clothing, medical care, or transportation. Even
without particularized speech . . . the presence of an unkempt and disheveled
person holding out his or her hand or a cup to receive a donation itself conveys
a message of need for support and assistance." Id. at 704.
45. Id. at 703; see Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
46. Loper, 999 F.2d at 703; see supra note 36.
47. Id. at 704-05 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). This strict scrutiny test was required because the statute
was proscribing protected speech in a public forum. Id. at 703.
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The court placed great emphasis on the broad character of the statute
and its total prohibition of all begging in all public places. 48 While
noting that a state or local government could have a compelling
interest in preventing the evils that are sometimes associated with
begging, the court concluded: "[A] statute that totally prohibits
begging in all public places cannot be considered 'narrowly tailored'
to achieve that end." '49 The court determined that allowing such a
broad prohibition to withstand judicial scrutiny would leave beggars
with no alternative channels in which to communicate their plight to
others.5 0
Finally, the Second Circuit held that even if strict scrutiny was
not the proper test of the statute's constitutionality, the statute at
issue could not be justified as a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction on speech because it was a content-based, overbroad
restriction on speech. 5' A content-neutral statute, as defined by the
court, is one that does not embrace, affect, or target a specific subset
of speech for prohibition.12 The court observed that the New York
statute specifically targeted for prohibition all speech related to
begging and, thus, would improperly prohibit such protected activities
as solicitation of contributions and donations by both groups and
individuals who were members of charitable, religious, or political
organizations. 3 Therefore, the court deemed that the statute was not
content-neutral .54
In a case more factually similar to the situation confronting the
City of Baltimore, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California reached a different result. In Joyce v. City of
San Francisco,55 a class of homeless persons brought a class action
48. Id.
49. Id. at 705.
50. Id. The court noted that the total prohibition of begging in public areas made
the statute fundamentally different from regulations prohibiting all solicitations
in the subways of New York City because the subway regulations did not
prevent begging in public streets. Id.
51. Id. at 704-05. This test was first adopted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court upheld the
conviction of a Vietnam War protestor for burning his draft card. To survive
constitutional attack under this test, the statute at issue must be capable of
characterization as a regulation of the time, place, and manner of expression
that is content neutral, is narrowly tailored to serve significant government
interests, and leaves open alternative channels of communication. Id. at 376-
77.
52. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
53. Loper, 999 F.2d at 704-05.
54. Id. at 704-05.
55. 846 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Although the statutory scheme at issue in
Joyce concerned aggressive panhandling, it also restricted or prohibited a wide
variety of other types of conduct completely unrelated to aggressive solicitations
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suit against the City of San Francisco and sought a declaratory
judgment that the city's Matrix Program singled out the homeless
and unconstitutionally penalized them for engaging in various life-
sustaining activities.56 The plaintiffs alleged that the program vested
too much discretion in the police officers charged with its enforce-
ment. 7 The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin
the enforcement of the Matrix Program pending a trial on the
merits. 8 Plaintiffs mounted a two-pronged, constitutional attack on
the Matrix Program and argued that it (1) violated the Eighth
Amendment because it punished individuals for the involuntary status
of homelessness and (2) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because its enactment and enforcement were
designed to invidiously discriminate against the homeless. 9 The court
rejected each of these arguments in turn.6
First, the court declined to hold that homelessness, by itself,
equalled a status and explained that the Supreme Court cases of
Robinson v. California6' and Powell v. Texas 2 did not require this
like panhandling, and was, therefore, grouped with the broad begging prohi-
bitions for purposes of this Comment.
56. The Matrix Program was instituted following a 1992 report from the San
Francisco Mayor's Office of Economic Planning and Development, which
attributed the city's sluggish economy to the conduct of the city's increasing
homeless population. Id. at 846. The report described the program as "initiated
to address citizen complaints about a broad range of offenses occurring on
streets and in parks and neighborhoods ... and a directed effort to end street
crimes of all kinds." Id.
The program was composed of two parts: (1) stringent enforcement of several
criminal laws to deter behaviors of the homeless that made the city a less
desirable place to live and work; and (2) a non-punitive component utilizing
social and health care workers designed to familiarize the homeless with services
and programs available to them, including sources of shelter and medical
services. Id. at 846-47. The city's estimated spending to fund the non-punitive
programs for fiscal year 1993-94 was $46.4 million. Id. at 848.
Few Matrix-related offenses-which included public drinking and inebriation,
camping or sleeping in public parks, and aggressive panhandling-resulted in
arrest. In most instances, these violations only resulted in admonition by
enforcing officers or in a citation. Any individuals who were arrested, however,
were usually released on their own recognizancc, or with credit for time served,
and were released the following day. Id. at 846, 848-49.
57. Id. at 847.
58. Id. at 845.
59. Id. at 853, 858.
60. Id. at 858, 860.
61. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, the United States Supreme Court held that
a statute punishing a person for the offense of "being a drug addict" violated
the Eighth Amendment because a violation of the statute was predicated on
the status of being addicted to narcotics, rather than upon any particular act.
Id. at 666.
62. 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968). In Powell, the United States Supreme Court held
that a statute punishing the offense of "public drunkenness" did not violate
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conclusion. The Matrix Program punished specific criminal conduct;
the fact that the homeless, by virtue of their condition, were more
likely to account for a disproportionate number of cited and detained
individuals under the Matrix Program did not, in the court's opinion,
mandate the conclusion that the program punished homelessness per
se.63 The court justified this conclusion by explaining that a contrary
holding would have a "staggering" and "devastating" effect on
constitutional jurisprudence because it would severely hamper state
and local law enforcement efforts to ensure public safety and welfare
and because it would constitute an inappropriate intrusion into state
and local affairs and authority."
The court gave short shrift to the contention that the Matrix
Program violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court claimed
that the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence indicative of an
invidious, discriminatory purpose to the city's enactment of the
program or of discriminatory enforcement by the police. 65 The court
greatly emphasized the strict enforcement guidelines and the contin-
uing training and education provided to all police officers as strongly
persuasive indicators that the city desired non-discriminatory enforce-
ment of the Matrix Program."
Two important concepts can be gleaned from the Joyce decision.
First, that the weight of authority supports the conclusion that
homelessness is not a protected status and that ordinances like San
Francisco's (and Baltimore's) do not offend the Constitution by
criminalizing certain conduct associated with the condition of being
homeless. 67 As the Joyce court pointed out, the fact that homelessness
the Eighth Amendment because it did not, as in Robinson, punish the status
of being an alcoholic; rather, it punished a particular act-the conduct of
being drunk in public.
63. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 857-58. But cf. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.
Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (appeal pending) (holding that homelessness is a
status for which a person may not be punished under the Eighth Amendment).
64. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 858. If homelessness were judicially recognized as a
status, almost any involuntary condition could be analogized to homelessness,
and there would be no principled method to make necessary differentiations.
Adoption of this position would "significantly limit the States in their efforts
to deal with a widespread and important social problem and would do so by
announcing a revolutionary doctrine of constitutional law that would also
tightly restrict state power to deal with a wide variety of other harmful
conduct." Id. (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1968) (Black, J.,
concurring)).
65. Id. at 858-59. The court reasoned: "When the basic classification is rationally
related, uneven effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of
no constitutional concern." Id. (quoting Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)).
66. Id. at 859.
67. But see Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. 1551 (appeal pending) (holding that homeless-
ness is a "status" for which a person may not be convicted under the Eighth
Amendment).
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is often an involuntary condition, similar to addiction to drugs or
alcohol, does not justify the offensive and threatening conduct often
associated with the condition." As long as the ordinance in question
does not directly punish a person for being homeless, 69 but instead
punishes specific conduct in public areas, it will survive scrutiny
under the Eighth Amendment.7"
Second, it is much harder for a plaintiff to prove purposeful,
invidiously discriminatory police enforcement of an anti-panhandling
ordinance if the police officers have been given strict enforcement
guidelines and, more importantly, have been given thorough training
in constitutionally appropriate interaction with homeless individuals.
Both of these precautions considerably reduce the police discretion
in law enforcement. This reduction in police discretion makes it very
unlikely that a content-neutral ordinance will be invalidated because
of the disparaging effect that arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment has on the homeless. The reduction in discretion also helps to
eliminate the appearance of targeting solely the homeless for enforce-
ment and punishment.
B. Challenges to Restrictions on Begging in Particular Areas
Other cities have chosen to enact ordinances prohibiting begging
in specific public areas and in areas open to the public. These
enactments typically prohibit all begging, regardless of whether it is
passive or aggressive in nature, in places where encounters with
strangers are inherently more coercive than they would be on public
streets. 7' Although the Supreme Court has not yet specifically ad-
dressed whether begging is protected speech under the First Amend-
68. Joyce, 846 F. Supp. at 855.
69. For example, suppose City X passed an ordinance stating: "It shall be a crime
for anyone to be found in a condition of homelessness anywhere within the
boundaries of this city. Anyone found guilty of violating this ordinance shall
be required to pay a fine not exceeding $100, or be sentenced to serve not
more than thirty days in jail, or both."
This ordinance would be plainly unconstitutional because it punishes the
condition of being homeless, not any particular acts associated with being
homeless. It is roughly akin to the medieval vagrancy statutes that were struck
down on due process grounds by the United States Supreme Court in Papach-
ristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (holding that vagrancy
ordinance was void for vagueness and placed unfettered discretion in hands of
police).
70. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968); Joyce v. City of San Francisco,
846 F. Supp. 843, 857-58 (N.D. Cal. 1994); see supra note 62.
71. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3312(b)-(d) (1994) (prohibiting begging at bus,
train, or subway stations or stops; within ten feet of any automatic teller
machine; or from any operator or occupant of a motor vehicle that is in traffic
or on a public street).
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ment, the Court has addressed the issue of whether municipalities
and regulatory agencies can constitutionally prohibit begging in areas
where the public seeks access to public transportation.
The first case to address whether begging could be the proper
subject of governmental regulation was Young v. New York City
Transit Authority.7 In Young, an organization representing homeless
individuals brought a class action suit challenging a transit authority
regulation that prohibited begging and panhandling in New York
City's subway system. 73 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York's7 4 decision, which struck down the
regulation as violative of the First Amendment. 71
In its opinion, the court of appeals expressly held that begging
was not speech protected by the First Amendment. 76 The court also
held that begging was not the type of expressive conduct covered by
the First Amendment by virtue of the fact that it lacked "[a]n intent
to convey a particularized message ... that ... would be understood
by those who viewed it." ' 7 7 The court stated that the common theme
running through all acts of panhandling was the bare desire for
money, which the court held was far outside the scope of protected
speech under the First Amendment. 78 In contrast, the court recognized
a sufficient nexus between solicitation by organized charities and a
variety of speech interests to invoke the protections of the First
Amendment. 79
Given the lack of a definitive decision by the United States
Supreme Court on whether begging is speech protected by the First
72. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
73. The Transit Authority had maintained a long-standing ban on begging in the
subway system pursuant to 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1050.6(b), which stated: "[N]o
person, unless duly authorized .. .shall upon any facility or conveyance ...
solicit alms, subscription, or contribution for any purpose." In 1989, the
Transit Authority held hearings to amend § 1050.6, resulting in the promul-
gation of § 1050.6(c), which permitted greater access to the transit system for
certain non-commercial activities such as "public speaking; distribution of
written materials; solicitation for charitable, religious or political solicitation;
and artistic performances, including the acceptance of donations." 21 N.Y.C.R.R.
§ 1050.6(c). Place restrictions were imposed on these non-commercial uses of
the subway system, but the long-standing prohibition on begging was left intact
and panhandlers became the target of stricter enforcement efforts. Young, 903
F.2d at 148-49.
74. 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
75. Young, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
76. Id. at 152-54. The court stated that "common sense tells us that begging is
much more 'conduct' than it is 'speech."' Id. at 153.
77. Id. (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
78. Id. at 154.
79. Id. at 155.
19951
Amendment, the court of appeals, in Young, offered an alternative
basis for upholding the Transit Authority's regulations. The court
reasoned that the regulation would be valid under the United States
v. O'Brien time, place, and manner standard, even if begging were
in fact constitutionally protected expression.8 0 Under this standard,
a restriction on free expression that is inseparably intertwined with
conduct will be upheld if (1) the activity is a constitutionally proper
subject for regulation, (2) the regulation furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and (3) any incidental restriction on First Amendment
speech is no greater than that which is essential to further the asserted
interest 81
The court of appeals recognized the Transit Authority's broad
statutory power "to promulgate rules 'governing the conduct and
safety of the public as it ... [deemed] necessary, convenient, or
desirable." 8 2 In addition, the court noted that the regulation at issue
advanced the substantial and legitimate governmental interests of
maintaining public safety and order on the public transit system. 3
The court then recognized that the requirement that the regulation
be unrelated to the suppression of free expression essentially meant
that it be content-neutral8 The court concluded that the subway-
begging regulation was content-neutral because the justification for
the regulation-the prevention of passenger intimidation and harass-
ment-was completely unrelated to any message communicated by
80. Id. at 157-59. See supra note 51 for a discussion of the O'Brien test.
81. Id. (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
82. Id. at 158 (quoting N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 1204).
83. The court noted:
A majority of the subway's over three million daily passengers perceive
begging and panhandling to be "intimidating," "threatening," and
"harassing" . . . involv[ing] "unwanted touching [and] detaining" of
passengers. The police have great difficulty distinguishing between
"panhandling and extortion." Begging is "inherently aggressive" to
the "captive" passengers in the close confines of the subway atmos-
phere. Based on these facts ... begging in the subway often amounts
to nothing less than assault, creating in the passengers the apprehension
of imminent danger. Additionally, begging in the subway raises legit-
imate concerns about public safety. The conduct "disrupts" and
"startles" passengers, thus creating the potential for a serious accident
in the fast-moving and crowded subway environment.
Id.
84. Id.; see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that
a "regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is
deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages
but not others"); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 295 (1984) (holding that regulation was content-neutral and was not being
applied because of disagreement with the message it conveyed).
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beggars.85 Finally, the court held that the Transit Authority had
demonstrated that the "only effective way to stop begging in the
[subway] system was through the enforcement of a total ban. 8 6 The
court noted that the regulation prohibited begging only in the subway;
the regulation did not impose any prohibition upon begging and
panhandling on the public streets and sidewalks of the city. Therefore,
because of its narrow application, the regulation left open ample
alternative avenues of communication.87
The landmark decision in Young set off a firestorm of contro-
versy among legal scholars, the majority of whom have criticized the
court's reasoning .88 Criticism was not restricted to merely academic
circles; several other courts addressing the constitutionality of res-
trictions on begging took exception with the holding in Young.
In International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISK-
CON) v. Lee,89 a non-profit religious corporation brought an action
challenging the restrictions of the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey on the distribution of literature and on the solicitation
of donations and contributions in airport terminals. 90 Members of
ISKCON performed a ritual known as sankirtan, which entailed
going into public areas, disseminating religious literature, and solic-
iting funds to support the Hara Krishna religion.91 The Port Authority
85. Young, 903 F.2d at 159.
86. Id. at 160.
87. Id. The Second Circuit concluded that the Transit Authority's regulation left
open ample alternative channels of communication because begging was not
prohibited throughout all of New York City, but rather only in the subway.
Id. In arriving at this conclusion, the court noted that the appellants had not
suggested that "any barrier to delivering to the media, or to the public by
other means, the intended message concerning the plight of the homeless"
existed as a result of the regulation, or that the remaining avenues of com-
munication were inadequate. Id. at 161 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 295 (1984));
see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53-54 (1986)
(upholding city ordinance prohibiting adult movie theatres within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, family dwelling, church, park or school since it left 520
acres, or about five percent of the city land, available for such theatres)
(discussed in greater detail, infra, Part IV(B)(I)).
88. See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, Begging to Differ: The First
Amendment and the Right to Beg, 104 HARv. L. REV. 896 (1991); Susan
Daniel, Note, The Second Circuit Refuses to Extend Beggars a Helping Hand:
Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 969 (1991);
Stephanie M. Kaufman, Note, The Speech/Conduct Distinction and First
Amendment Protection of Begging in Subways, 79 GEO. L.J. 1803 (1991);
Scott D. Sitner, Note, Beggar's Banquet: The First Amendment Right to Beg,
1991 DET. C.L. REV. 795 (1991).
89. 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
90. Id. at 2703-04.
91. Id. at 2703 (quoting ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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regulation at issue prohibited the repetitive solicitation of money or
distribution of literature inside the airport terminals. 92
The United States Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion au-
thored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that although ISKCON's
solicitation was protected speech under the First Amendment, 93 the
airport terminals at issue were neither traditional public fora nor
designated public fora, locations where the protections of the First
Amendment are at their peak.9 The Court reasoned that airport
terminals were not traditional public fora and that, unlike public
streets and parks, they have not been held immemorially in trust for
the use of the public to assemble, communicate, and discuss public
issues and questions. 95 The Court explained that the airport terminal
was a modern innovation and, therefore, that it could hardly con-
stitute a place 'immemorially' . . . held in the public trust .. . for
... expressive activity."6 The Court also noted that it had only in
recent years become a common practice for religious and non-profit
organizations to use airports as a forum for the distribution of
92. Id. at 2704. The regulation provided, in relevant part:
1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of
buildings or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to
or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner:
c. Solicitation and receipt of funds.
Id. (quoting ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 578-81 (1991)).
93. Id. at 2706-07. The Court stated: "It is uncontested that the solicitation at
issue in this case is a form of speech protected under the First Amendment."
Id. at 2705.
94. Id. at 2706-07. Under this forum-based approach, the character and nature of
the property upon which the speech occurs is the focus of the Court's threshold
inquiry. A regulation of speech on government or public property, like that
on streets and public parks, has traditionally been available for public speech,
expression, and the free trade of ideas, and has been subject to the highest
judicial scrutiny. Such regulations are presumed to be unconstitutional, and
survive constitutional challenge only if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling governmental interest. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
A regulation of speech in a designated public forum-property that the
government has set aside and specifically opened up for expressive activity to
all or a portion of the public-is subject to the same constitutional restrictions
as traditional public fora. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Edu-
cators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
Finally, a regulation of speech on all public property that does not fall
within either of the two above-listed categories is subject only to the limitation
of reasonableness, so long as the regulation is not part of an effort to suppress
the speaker's activity solely out of disagreement with the speaker's viewpoint.
Id. at 2705-06 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
95. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2706.
96. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939)).
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literature, the proselytizion of new members, and other similar activ-
ities. 97 In addition, the Court viewed the Port Authority's continued
opposition to solicitation in the terminals through frequent litigation
as belying any claim that the terminals were designated forums for
expressive activity. 98 Therefore, the Port Authority's action was not
subjected to heightened review and exacting scrutiny; it only had to
meet the more moderate standard of reasonableness. 99
Given the risks of duress and fraud inherent in face-to-face
solicitations in places like airport terminals, where the individuals
solicited are frequently on tight schedules, the Court held that the
regulation was reasonable.' °° The Court emphasized that the Port
Authority regulation did not prohibit all solicitation, but merely
prohibited solicitation conducted inside the terminal area of the
airport, an area where the potential for coercion is heightened. °'0 The
Court also emphasized that the sidewalk areas outside the terminals
were left open for solicitation and for distribution of literature. 0 2
C. Challenges to Aggressive Begging Statutes
Anti-aggressive begging statutes and ordinances are fast becom-
ing the weapon of choice for cities and municipalities in their fight
to preserve public safety, societal order, and some semblance of a
viable economic base. This type of ordinance has garnered positive
returns in its relatively few ventures into the judicial process. 03
In City of Seattle v. Webster,'°4 the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington became the highest state court to address the extent to which
a state or municipality could constitutionally prohibit begging. In
Webster, the court considered a Seattle ordinance' 5 that lower state
97. Id. (quoting 45 FED. REG. 35314 (1980)).
98. Id. at 2706-07.
99. Id. at 2708. The Court reaffirmed its statement, made in United States v.
Kokinda, that the restrictions on speech on public property that was neither a
traditional nor a designated public forum "need only be reasonable; it need
not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation." United States
v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S.
788, 808 (1985)).
100. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2708. The Court noted that "delays may be particularly
costly in [the airport] setting, as a missed flight . . . can result in hours worth
of subsequent inconvenience." Id.
101. Id. at 2704.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Roulette v. City of Seattle, 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994);
City of Seattle v. Webster, 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S.
908 (1991). Contra Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
104. 802 P.2d 1333 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 908 (1991).
105. SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 12A.12.015 provides, in relevant part:
A. The following definitions apply in this section:
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courts had held to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in
violation of the First Amendment.'06 Respondent Webster also as-
serted an equal protection challenge, arguing that the ordinance was
directed specifically at the homeless beggars in and around the Seattle
metropolitan area. '07
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed and held that the
ordinance was neither overbroad nor vague by constitutional stan-
dards. 08 The court concluded that, under the statute, "aggressive
panhandling" was a specific intent offense and, therefore, that the
statute did not prohibit "innocent intentional acts which merely
consequentially block traffic or cause others to take evasive ac-
tion.' 09 The court concluded that this intent element saved the
ordinance from being vague or overbroad because the language of
the ordinance "clearly indicate[d] that, before there c[ould] be a
charge or conviction under the ordinance, a person must [have acted]
with intent to block another's passage or with intent to cause a
person or vehicle to take evasive action."" 0 In the court's view, this
specific intent requirement insured that constitutionally protected free
speech activities, as well as innocent intentional acts, would not be
swept within the ordinance's prohibitions."'
In addition, the court held that the ordinance did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause because it applied equally to all indivi-
duals possessing the required criminal intent." 2 The court concluded
that because the ordinance was facially neutral, and because Webster
produced no evidence that he was in fact a homeless person, the
ordinance was not directed specifically at the homeless.'
1. "Aggressively beg" means to beg with intent to intimidate
another person into giving money or goods.
B. A person is guilty of pedestrian interference if... [that person]
intentionally:
2. Aggressively begs.
Webster, 802 P.2d at 1337.
106. Id. at 1339.
107. The court rejected Webster's Equal Protection argument, holding that the
Pedestrian Interference Ordinance was facially neutral. Id. at 1340. The court
further indicated that the trial record failed to indicate that Webster was in
fact a homeless person, and that such a bare record could not provide the
basis to support the finding of an Equal Protection violation. Id.
108. Id. at 1338-40.
109. Id. at 1338.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1337-38.
112. Id. at 1340.
113. Id. The Washington Supreme Court noted that it had recently upheld a similar
ordinance against an equal protection challenge. See Seattle v. Stack, 784 P.2d
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Seattle's Aggressive Begging Ordinance was later re-examined by
a federal court in Roulette v. City of Seattle."4 In Roulette, a diverse
group of plaintiffs composed of homeless individuals and advocate
groups for the homeless challenged the constitutionality of Seattle's
ordinance." 5 Significantly, Seattle's Aggressive Panhandling Ordi-
nance had been amended since the Webster decision. The amendments
defined "intimidate" to mean "engag[ing] in conduct which would
make a reasonable person feel fearful or compelled to give '"116 and
added a list of circumstances that could be considered when deter-
mining whether a person possessed the intent to intimidate." 7 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
rejected Plaintiffs' overbreadth challenge to the ordinance."'
As a preliminary matter, the district court, relying on the clear
line of Supreme Court precedent that held that the speech of chari-
table solicitors was protected by the First Amendment," 9 explained
that the city had conceded that begging, if done peacefully, was
entitled to some degree of protection under the First Amendment. 20
The court then turned its attention to the heart of Plaintiffs' First
Amendment challenge-that the ordinance was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it "d[id] not aim specifically at evils within the
allowable area of state control but, . . . swe[pt] within its ambit
other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute[d] an exercise
of freedom of speech."' 2' The court noted that the ordinance did
not prohibit all begging; rather, it prohibited "only begging 'with
the intent to intimidate . ".".."'122 After analyzing the statute's defi-
nition of "intimidate," the court concluded that only begging that
494 (Wash. 1989) (upholding Seattle's "prostitution loitering" ordinance). In
addition, the court noted that "nothing in the [aggressive panhandling] ordi-
nance refer[ed] to economic circumstances or residential status." Webster, 802
P.2d at 1340.
114. 850 F. Supp. 1442 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
115. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1444.
116. SEATTLE MUM. CODE § 12A.12.015(A)(2).
117. Id. § 12A.12.015(C). This list includes: touching the person solicited, following
the person solicited, persisting in the solicitation after a negative response has
been given, and using profane or abusive language in the solicitation. Id.
118. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1444, 1453.
119. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 701, 703-04 (2d Cir.
1993) (citing Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988);
Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984);
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980));
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
120. Roulette, 850 F. Supp. at 1451. The court also noted that the City apparently
found the Second Circuit's decision in Loper persuasive. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)).
122. Id. at 1452.
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would make a person feel fearful or compelled to give was prohibited
by the ordinance. 23The court recognized that this interpretation of the ordinance
could be read to proscribe "speech other than those threats unpro-
tected by the First Amendment," and was, therefore, of questionable
constitutional validity. 24 Instead of overturning the ordinance because
it was facially overbroad, however, the court opted to cure this defect
with a limiting construction. 25 The court limited "intimidate" to
mean "conduct which threatens the person solicited" and limited
"compel" to mean "threat." The court further limited the ordi-
nance's coverage to "prohibit only those threats which would make
a reasonable person fearful of harm to his or her person or prop-
erty.' ' 26 Given the adoption of this construction, the court struck
down the circumstances section of the ordinance because some of
the circumstances described speech that was clearly protected by the
First Amendment. 127
Roulette explicitly demonstrates the requirement that an aggres-
sive panhandling ordinance be very content-specific regarding the
types of conduct within its scope, especially when the ordinance is
targeting begging in public places or areas. More importantly, Rou-
lette concretely illustrates the drafting problems associated with en-
acting any law that impinges upon constitutionally protected speech.
If an ordinance does not contain a section listing or defining pro-
hibited conduct with precision, the ordinance is susceptible to con-
stitutional attack on the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. On
the other hand, a high degree of specificity in defining the prohibited
conduct creates the perception that the ordinance is directed only at
a specific class, which opens the door for an equal protection
challenge.
In Blair v. Shanahan, 28 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that California Penal Code
section 647(c), a state statute that prohibited accosting others in a
public place or in any place open to the public for the purpose of
begging,' 29 violated both the First and the Fourteenth Amendments.'30
123. Id. at 1453.
124. Id. at 1452-53.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1453.
127. Id. at 1454.
128. 775 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Cal. 1991), cert. denied, 115 S, Ct. 1698 (1995).
129. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(c)(West 1977) provides in relevant part: Anyone
"[w]ho accosts other persons in any public place or in any place open to the
public for the purpose of begging or soliciting alms is guilty of a misdemeanor."
Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1317 n.1-
130. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324-26.
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In Blair, a former panhandler brought a civil rights action against
the City of San Francisco and several of its police officers for
arresting him in violation of California's anti-begging statute. 3 The
court held that begging was protected speech under the First Amend-
ment, 32 disagreeing with the Second Circuit's contrary holding in
Young.'33 In stark contrast to Young's holding that begging was mere
conduct, and not speech at all,'34 the Blair court concluded: "Begging
gives the speaker an opportunity to spread his views and ideas on,
among other things, the way our society treats its poor and disen-
franchised."' 35 The court held that the communication of these
messages was sufficient to qualify begging as protected speech. 3 6 In
criticizing the Young court's distinction between solicitations by
organized charities and solicitation by individuals on their own be-
half, 1 7 the court reasoned: "No distinction of constitutional dimen-
sion exists between soliciting funds for oneself and [soliciting funds]
for charities." 138
Because the California statute was a content-based restriction
aimed specifically at speech in a public forum, 39 the court applied
the strict scrutiny test enunciated in Boos v. Barry,140 which required
that the restriction on speech be "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and . .. narrowly drawn to achieve that end.' 4' The
court noted that in a prior case, the Court of Appeals of California
determined that the essential purpose of section 647(c) was to avoid
131. Id. at 1317.
132. Id. at 1324.
133. 903 F.2d 146, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990).
134. Young, 903 F. Supp. at 153.
135. Cf. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1323 ("[Clommon sense tells us that begging is
much more 'conduct' than it is 'speech.').
136. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1322-23.
137. The Young court recognized that "a sufficient nexus between solicitation by
organized charities and a 'variety of speech interests' [existed) to invoke
protection under the First Amendment." Young, 903 F.2d at 155.
138. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1322. In analyzing the distinction drawn by the Second
Circuit, the court stated:
Although many professional fund raisers undoubtedly believe in the
causes they promote and genuinely seek to educate others about these
causes, many professional fund raisers, like beggars, primarily seek
to effect a transfer of money. That the pleas of a beggar or profes-
sional fund raiser may change the way his listeners think about their
world is often only a desirable side effect. The professional fund
raiser may present a clearer message to his listener than the beggar
does. But First Amendment protection should not be limited to the
articulate.
Id. at 1324.
139. Id.
140. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
141. Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1324 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
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public "annoyance.' '1 42 The city also asserted that section 647(c)
protected the general public from "intrusive conduct which [wa]s
threatening and coercive to those who [weire accosted" and from
"intrusive, coercive behavior."'' 4 3 While the court agreed that pro-
tecting the public from threatening and dangerous behavior was a
compelling government interest, it concluded that section 647(c) was
not necessary to achieve this goal.'" The court concluded: "Any of
the acts of coercing, threatening, or intimidating, if clearly defined,
may be constitutionally punished ... via a statute that does not
limit the freedom of speech of some citizens,' ' 45 and stated that the
state had "a plethora of content-neutral statutes" that could be
utilized to curtail offensive conduct. 4 In addition, the court held
that section 647(c) was not narrowly tailored to serve its alleged
purposes because it did not, on its face or as applied, "require that
an 'accost' be either threatening, intimidating, or coercive" before a
person was subjected to a criminal penalty. 47
Finally, the court held that section 647(c) violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it "discrim-
inate[d] between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the content
of . . . communication."'' 48 The court analogized section 647(c) to an
Illinois statute, which banned all picketing on non-labor issues, that
was struck down on equal protection grounds in Carey v. Brown, 149
and concluded that section 647(c) suffered the same constitutional
deficiencies. 50
142. Id. at 1324 (citing Ulmer v. Municipal Court for Oakland-Piedmont Judicial
Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (1976)).
143. Id.
144. "Protecting the public from intimidation, threats, or coercion simply does not
require that a form of speech, possessing obvious political relevance and
pertinence to the community, which is of crucial importance to those that
express the speech, be precluded." Id.
145. Id.
146. The court listed several of these statutes, including: CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 211
(robbery); 240 (assault); 242 (battery); 415(1) (challenging to a fight); 415(2)
(disturbing another by loud noise); 415(3) (use of offensive words); and 647(c)
(willful and malicious obstruction of thoroughfares and public places). Id. at
1324 n.10.
147. The court interpreted "accost" to mean "[wlalking up to and approaching a
passerby," and concluded that walking up to someone was not a "concrete
enough proxy for a threat [or intimidation] to warrant this restriction on
speech." Id. at 1324.
148. Id. at 1325 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980)).
149. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
150. "All 'accosts,' however defined, may be disruptive, but this statute does not
bar all accosts .... The issue is not whether all beggars are treated alike, but
whether all who approach others and speak to them first are treated alike.
Manifestly, they are not." Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1325.
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Although the Blair court concluded that the statute at issue was
riddled with constitutional deficiencies, the court made several im-
portant observations. First, it acknowledged that even though begging
was protected First Amendment speech, a state or municipality could
constitutionally regulate begging if it enacted a narrowly drawn
statute or ordinance that punished or prohibited, not the speech
element of begging, but only a clearly defined conduct element of
begging.' Second, the court recognized that the protection of public
safety from threatening or dangerous conduct and the maintenance
of public order were compelling government interests. 15 2 Finally, the
court noted that it was appropriate for legislative bodies to take the
inherent differences between begging and other forms of speech into
account when drafting a statute with the goal of reducing the
"perceived evil of street intimidation for money."'5 3 Therefore, the
holding is not as broad as it may seem at first blush. Basically, the
court only condemned the structure of the statute at issue and did
not really question the legitimacy of government attempts to control
begging. The court simply held that the City of San Francisco failed
to meet the burden of proof associated with a content-based restric-
tion on speech. The outcome'would likely have been different if the
court had been confronted with a narrowly tailored and properly
drafted anti-aggressive panhandling statute.
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF
AGGRESSIVE PANHANDLING IN BALTIMORE
A. The Instant Case-Patton v. City of Baltimore
The district court in Patton based its holding-that Baltimore's
Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance was unconstitutional-on the fact
that it was a content-based restriction on free speech in a public
forum, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 5 4 The court, clearly persuaded by the Blair court's
reasoning, adopted that analysis.' First, the court conducted a First
Amendment analysis of the ordinance and determined, in accordance
151. Id. at 1324-25.
152. Id. at 1324.
153. This "court recognizes that there is the possibility that a request for a dollar,
which when transcribed onto paper ... may actually have been, depending
[upon] the circumstances of the moment, intended to be, or perceived as, a
demand for a dollar .... The people of San Francisco deserve, and are
entitled to expect, police protection from any such intimidation, coercion, or
threat for alms." Id.
154. Patton v. City of Baltimore, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 57-58, 65-67 (D. Md.
Aug. 19, 1994).
155. Id. at 56.
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with the weight of decided authority, that begging was protected
speech under the First Amendment. 5 6 The court cited Loper and
Blair with approval, noting that "the distinction between soliciting
funds for oneself and for charities [wals not a distinction of consti-
tutional dimension." 157
The court then determined that the ordinance was content-based
because only aggressive panhandling, or charitable solicitation for
money for oneself, was prohibited.' 58 The court noted that content-
based speech restrictions were analyzed under both the Equal Pro-
tection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment for
constitutional infirmity. 15 9 The court applied the strict scrutiny test
in both situations. Under the First Amendment analysis, to survive
judicial scrutiny, a content-based restriction on speech must be "nec-
essary to serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn
to achieve that end"' ' 0 and finely tailored to serve substantial state
interests, with sufficient justification for any distinctions it draws.
The court recognized the subtle distinction between the strict scrutiny
156. Id.; see Blair, 775 F. Supp. at 1322-24 ("This court finds that begging
constitutes protected speech."); Loper, 999 F.2d at 704 ("While we indicated
in Young that begging does not always involve the transmission of a particu-
larized .. .message, . . . it seems certain that it usually involves some com-
munication of that nature."); Chad v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 861 F. Supp.
1057 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (assuming, without deciding, that begging is expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment).
157. The court observed: "[Panhandling, like other charitable solicitations, impli-
cates a variety of speech interests, . . . [and] convey[s] information about the
panhandler's need for food, clothing, shelter, or transportation but often ...
[also] convey[s] a message about how our society treats its poor, homeless
[members]." Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 56 (citing Blair, 775 F. Supp. at
1322-23).
158. The court noted:
Persons who are not "panhandling," but are making other types of
solicitations, such as requests for political contributions or commercial
benefits, are not subjected to the ordinance's requirements. The or-
dinance therefore places greater burdens on the speech-related activities
of some citizens, but not others, based solely upon the content of
their speech.
Id. at 57-58.
159. Id. at 60-61. All equal protection challenges involving state action are analyzed
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 754 (1966). In addition, the prohibitions of the
First Amendment, originally applicable only to the federal government, have
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and are, thus, applicable to the state governments as well. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
160. Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 61 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
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analyses under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and their
overlap in coverage.1 61
Under the First Amendment test, the court noted that Baltimore's
ordinance was much more narrowly tailored than the ordinances and
statutes in Loper, Blair, or Roulette, because it neither prohibited
all begging in any public place, nor vaguely defined the types of
offensive and threatening conduct that would subject a panhandler
to criminal penalty. 62 Rather, the Baltimore ordinance struck "a
constitutional balance between the rights of the solicitors and the
solicited and certainly ... [left] open ample alternate channels of
communication."' 163 The court concluded: "[A]ny person can beg on
the streets of downtown Baltimore and they may do it for any
purpose-the statute simply prohibits doing so in an aggressive
manner.' 1  In addition, the court determined that this narrow tai-
loring served the substantial and compelling interests of the city of
Baltimore, namely, the protection of citizens and tourists from threat-
ening, intimidating, or harassing behavior. 65 Therefore, the court
held that the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment. 166
The court held, however, that the ordinance violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the dis-
tinction drawn between panhandlers and other solicitors was not
supported by the city's substantial interest of preventing the public
from the threatening and offensive behavior of panhandlers. 67 The
court noted that the city had made no showing that panhandling was
inherently more intimidating than other types of solicitations for
money.'" The court concluded that this poor fit between the city's
161. The tests are grounded in distinctly different interests protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The court recognized:
[Tihe First Amendment test that is applied to content-based restrictions
on speech in traditional public fora focuses on whether there is a
compelling interest requiring the government to limit certain speech
and whether those limitations are narrowly tailored . . . to [promote]
a compelling government interest. The Fourteenth Amendment test,
in contrast, focuses on whether the discrimination between speakers
engaged in comparable speech-related activities, based upon the con-
tent of their speech, is narrowly tailored to further a compelling
government interest.
Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 61-62 (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461
(1980)).
162. Id. at 64.
163. Id. at 63-64.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 62.
166. Id. at 65.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 66.
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objectives and the discrimination included within the ordinance re-
quired the city to offer some other legitimately compelling interest
for which the ordinance was finely tailored. 69 The city failed to meet
this burden.
Interestingly, the court declined to adopt the Blair court's rea-
soning to its fullest extent, disagreeing with that court's conclusion
that no prohibition on solicitation could withstand Equal Protection
scrutiny. °70 The Blair court determined: "[A]ny such prohibition
necessarily draws an impermissible distinction between those who ask
strangers for money and those who ask strangers for directions, the
time of day, or to sign a petition.'' In response, the court noted
that requests for money were inherently more threatening than re-
quests for directions and that a request for a dollar could more likely
be perceived as the demand for a dollar. 72 The court concluded,
based upon its belief in varying degrees of intimidating behavior,
that the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance was distinguishable from
the statute in Blair because it prohibited only begging made in an
aggressive manner, which was inherently more disruptive and intim-
idating than other types of everyday speech made in an aggressive
manner.'73
Thus, in Patton, the district court "split the difference" in its
analysis of the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance. It held that the
ordinance survived First Amendment scrutiny because it was drafted
in a manner consistent with the high standards for content-based
restrictions of speech in public fora. 7 4 However, the court also held
that the ordinance did not survive the equal protection inquiry
because the city failed to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying
its discrimination among speakers in public fora. 175 Therefore, in
order to remedy this defect, the city must offer some other legitimate
compelling interest to which the statute is finely tailored. A secondary
169. Id. at 67. The court noted that the constitutional defect of the ordinance might
be remedied by amending it to include all aggressive solicitation of money,
regardless of the solicitor's purpose or intended use of the money, thereby
making the ordinance more consistent with the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
For the reasons stated in Part IV, infra, the court's proposed solution, if
followed by the city, could actually greatly exacerbate the Aggressive Panhan-
dling Ordinance's constitutional problems.
170. Id. at 68 (citing Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. 1315, 1325 (1991)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 69.
173. Id. at 65.
174. Id.
175. Id. The court correctly noted that the ordinance prohibited only aggressive
solicitation of monies for a charitable purpose, and that the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to address the city's asserted objective of preventing the
intimidation of tourists. Id. at 65-67.
[Vol. 24
Aggressive Panhandling
effects analysis may, ultimately, be the appropriate remedial measure.
B. Alternative Approaches
The city of Baltimore now must decide which approach to take
in order to cure the constitutional defects of its Aggressive Panhan-
dling Ordinance. The district court's opinion in Patton has left the
city in a difficult, Catch-22 situation, forcing the city to walk a fine
line when addressing the interplay between free speech and equal
protection. 176 Given the conclusion that begging is arguably consti-
tutionally protected speech, the city must narrowly tailor the ordi-
nance to survive First Amendment challenges. This narrow tailoring
inevitably involves drawing distinctions and classifications between
individuals in an effort to make the ordinance's prohibitions as clear
and as precise as possible and to prevent the proscription of too
much protected speech. These distinctions, however, open the ordi-
nance up to constitutional attack because they destroy its content-
neutrality and implicate the Equal Protection Clause by granting
categorical exemptions from its prohibitions. In short, under the
district court's reasoning in Patton, the ordinance must survive the
strict scrutiny test under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments
before a court will uphold its constitutionality.
The alternative approaches that follow acknowledge that the
question of the constitutionality of restrictions on begging is, without
a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, wide-open for judicial
and academic debate. In that vein, this portion of the Comment
offers an alternative to the strict scrutiny analysis utilized by the
Patton court, which would serve to balance the competing interests
at stake-governmental responsibility for the physical and economic
well-being of the public and an individual's right of free speech in
a public forum. In addition, it attempts to point out the problems
associated with the re-drafting approach suggested to the city by the
Patton court.
1. The "Secondary Effects" Analysis of City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 177 the Supreme
Court upheld, against First Amendment challenge, a city zoning
ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters within 1000 feet of
private residences, educational facilities, or places of worship. 178 Even
though the ordinance only applied to theaters that showed adult
176. Id.
177. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
178. Renton, 475 U.S. at 49-51.
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films, the Court held that the ordinance was content-neutral because
its underlying purpose was not aimed at the suppression of speech
or free expression-the showing of adult films-based on its con-
tent. 7 9 The Court concluded that the proper inquiry into the consti-
tutionality of the zoning ordinance was "whether the . . . ordinance
[was] designed to serve a substantial governmental interest [without]
unreasonably limit[ing] alternative avenues of communication."' 80
The Court readily concluded that Renton's "interest in attempting
to preserve the quality of urban life [wals one that [had to] be
accorded high respect."' 8' The Court rejected the respondents' ar-
gument that the city's justifications for the ordinance were conclusory
and speculative because the city enacted the ordinance without first
conducting studies specifically related to its particular problems or
needs that required the ordinance.8 2
In addition, the Court concluded that Renton's ordinance was
narrowly drawn to affect only the category of theaters shown to
produce the unwanted and harmful secondary effects and not to
affect activities wholly unrelated to the problem facing the commu-
nity.' 83 Interestingly, the Court gave great deference to the city's
conclusions that only adult theaters caused secondary effects, con-
cluding that there was "no basis ... for assuming that Renton
w[ould] not, in the future, amend its ordinance to include other
kinds of adult businesses . . . shown to produce the same kinds of
179. Id. at 47. The Court noted that the zoning ordinance could not easily be
classified as "content-based" or "content-neutral," but concluded:
[T]he ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently
from other kinds of theaters. Nevertheless . . . the . . . ordinance is
aimed not at the content of the films shown at "adult motion picture
theaters," but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the
surroun.ling community.... The predominant concerns ... [are]
with the secondary effects of adult theaters, and not with the content
of adult films themselves.
Id.
180. Id. at 50. The Court characterized this test as a form of time, place, and
manner regulation. Id. at 46.
181. Id. at 50 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71
(1976) (plurality opinion)).
182. Id. The Court explicitly held:
Renton was entitled to rely on the experiences of ... other cities ...
in enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance. The First Amendment
does not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct
new studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated
by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city ad-
dresses.
Id. at 51-52.
183. Id. at 52.
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secondary effects as adult theaters."&I Finally, the Court noted that
reasonable alternative channels for communication were left open by
the ordinance because it left almost five percent of the entire land
area of the city as sites for adult theaters.' 85
a. Rejection of the Renton Approach in Patton
Baltimore's Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance possesses many
of the same characteristics as the zoning ordinance upheld in Renton.
These similarities present a strong argument that Patton could easily
have been decided under the less stringent analysis employed in
Renton.
First, the enactment of the panhandling ordinance, according to
available legislative history, was motivated in part by the health and
housing problems associated with homelessness. 8 6 The city justifiably
needs to have a mechanism in place to combat these problems, which
will no doubt worsen as the number of homeless in the city increases.
Second, and more germane to the problem of aggressive panhandling,
the ordinance was enacted to prevent a higher incidence of street
crime, a well-documented secondary effect of an increase in an
aggressive behavior, such as aggressive panhandling, in a particular
area." 7 Finally, unlike anti-panhandling statutes from other jurisdic-
tions, Baltimore's ordinance does not punish all panhandling. 188 Rather,
it is narrowly tailored to address and punish begging that is accom-
plished through the utilization of aggressive, coercive, and threatening
conduct. 8 9 Therefore, anyone can panhandle for any purpose on the
streets of downtown Baltimore without fear of prosecution or pun-
ishment, unless he employs an aggressive manner.
184. Id. at 53.
185. Id. at 53-54.
186. Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 5 (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 13).
187. Id. (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 4, 11); see Tier, supra note 16
(discussing the "Broken Windows" effect).
188. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 99 F.2d at 702 (2d Cir. 1993) (New
York statute prohibiting loitering in a public place for the purpose of begging);
Blair v. Shanahan, 775 F. Supp. at 1318 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (California statute
prohibiting accosting for the purpose of begging), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1698
(1995).
189. Patton, Civil No. S 93-2389, at 63. The district court noted:
[Tlhe ... ordinance ... is narrowly tailored to the government's
compelling interest in protecting residents and visitors from threat-
ening, intimidating, or harassing behavior. The statute is aimed directly
at this interest by prohibiting panhandling accomplished by assault,
... battery, . . . and extortion .... The restrictions on other conduct
contained in the ordinance- following a person after that person has
refused to give money, . . . interfering with a person's safe passage,
... and directing obscene or abusive language toward that person
... -recognize that such specifically defined conduct can often be
interpreted as more than a mere "request" for money.
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In deciding Patton, the district court considered, and ultimately
rejected, the use of Renton's secondary effects rationale, holding that
the ordinance was content-based and, therefore, applying a strict
scrutiny analysis. 190 The court distinguished the instant case from
Renton and concluded that the ordinance was enacted because city
officials had determined that panhandling was "unpleasant and dis-
turbing to the tourists and visitors in the Downtown District." 191
Characterizing this as a "type of secondary effect based upon the
'emotive impact' of panhandling,"'1 92 the court determined that the
"secondary effects" rationale did not apply. 193
b. The Solution
To persuade a court to rely on the Renton rationale, the City
of Baltimore needs to restructure and enhance the ordinance's un-
derlying legislative history. The implication of Patton is clear-the
city presented the wrong secondary effects and rationale to persuade
the court that the ordinance was content-neutral. By asserting only
that the ordinance was enacted because panhandling was unpleasant
and disturbing to the tourists and visitors in the downtown district,' 94
the city sent up red flags to the court and brought the case squarely
within the holding of Boos v. Barry.9
190. Id. at 59-60.
191. Id. at 59 (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 11-13).
192. Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
193. Id. at 60. The district court reasoned that the city's asserted secondary effect
(that panhandling created the perception that Downtown Baltimore was an
unpleasant and unsafe place to visit) was based entirely upon the effect that
begging has on its listener, which was not the type of "secondary effect"
referred to by the Supreme Court in Renton. Id. at 59-60 (citing Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
194. Id. at 59 (citing SECURITY TASK FORCE REPORT at 11-13).
195. Id. at 59-60. In Barry, the United States Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a District of Columbia statute which prohibited (1) the
display of signs critical of foreign governments within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy, and (2) the congregation of individuals within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy and not dispersing when ordered to do so. Barry, 485 U.S. at 316-
17. Respondents argued that the Renton analysis was applicable to this set of
circumstances, stressing that the statute's display clause was enacted to address
a significant secondary effect-the United States' "obligation to shield diplo-
mats from speech that offends their dignity." Id. at 320. The Court held that
the Renton analysis was inapplicable to "[r]egulations that focus[ed] on the
direct impact of speech on its audience" and that "[1listeners' reactions to
speech [we]re not the type of 'secondary effects' we referred to in Renton."
Id. at 321. Significantly, in Barry, the Court noted that the respondents did
not justify the regulation by pointing to "congestion, to interference with
ingress or egress, to visual clutter, or to the need to protect the security of
embassies." Id. Instead, they relied on the need to protect the dignity of
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However, if the city can produce evidence of a correlation
between an increase in panhandling in an area and an increase in
the occurrence of serious street crime, it may be able to mount a
more persuasive argument for the ordinance's content-neutrality in
future cases. The city could obtain this evidence in a variety of
different ways. It could conduct a study that compares the increase
in the number of homeless individuals panhandling in the city with
police records and reports regarding the crime rate in the city during
that specific time period. 196 In addition, based on the Supreme Court's
holding in Renton, city officials could obtain the same data from
other cities and metropolitan areas across the country to bolster its
findings. 197 In obtaining this data from sister cities, city officials
ambassadors and embassy personnel by guarding them against speech critical
of their respective governments. Id. The Court held that the impact of speech
on the listener was not a "secondary effect" within the meaning of Renton.
Id. This asserted justification focused only on the content of the speech and
the direct impact of the speech on its listeners, an impermissible and insufficient
secondary effect. Id.
196. See East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 1995 WL 472074. In East Brooks Books, the Memphis
City Council enacted a "licensing and zoning scheme on all sexually oriented
businesses within the City of Memphis." Id. at 222. The ordinance was enacted
"to regulate sexually oriented businesses to promote the health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the citizens of the city and to establish reasonable and
uniform regulations to prevent the continued concentrations of sexually oriented
businesses within the city." Id. (citing ME pHis TENN. CODE § 20-121(a)(1)).
The preamble to the ordinance concluded that there were "serious secondary
effects, such as crime and neighborhood deterioration, associated with the
proliferation of sexually oriented businesses within the city." Id. The City
Council reached these conclusions after reviewing reports prepared by the
Memphis Vice Squad indicating unusually high numbers of arrests around
sexually oriented businesses and impact studies utilizing data from other cities.
Id.
197. The city should make a special effort to obtain data from Washington, D.C.,
given that city's experience with the homeless in general and, specifically, with
panhandling and given the proximity and similarity between the two cities. In
the 1980s, panhandling had become so bad in Washington, D.C. that forceful
action was necessary to bring some relief to pedestrians, merchants and tourists.
See Tracy Webb, D.C. Targets Street Begging, U.P.I., Apr. 20, 1991. When
the aggressive panhandling problem first came to the attention of the police'
department, it decided to start using an old vagrancy-type ordinance to selec-
tively arrest panhandlers in the Capitol Hill and Georgetown areas. Irvin
Molotsky, Upset By Beggars, Washington Is Arresting Them, N.Y. TRMEs,
Nov. 7, 1990, at A20. This ordinance prohibited a person from "wandering
abroad and begging, or [going] about from door to door or plac[ing] himself
in or on any highway, passage or other public place to beg or receive alms."
See Gabriel Escobar, D.C. Police Declare Streets Off-Limits to Persistent
Panhandlers, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1990, at DI. Use of this ordinance gave
D.C. police statutory authority to deal with aggressive and persistent pan-
handlers. Id.
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should focus on the preventive purpose of the ordinance-that its
enactment is necessary to prevent the situation in Baltimore from
becoming one of dangerous street criminality and of pervasive threat-
ening and coercive conduct and to prevent an overall decline in the
quality of life in the city. 198
Although enforcement of the "old" aggressive panhandling statute helped
to alleviate the panhandling problem in isolated areas of the city, it did little
to provide city-wide relief. In fact, the city-wide panhandling problem actually
worsened, with aggressive beggars becoming a common and disturbing presence
in most District neighborhoods and in some suburban communities with busy
commercial areas. Linda Wheeler, Panhandlers Tap Deep Pockets of Resent-
ment, WASH. POST, May 9, 1993, at BI. In fact, many residents began to feel
as if certain thoroughfares of the city were nothing but "street[s] of hands
and cups." Id. (quoting Dupont Circle resident Edward Grandis). In the
suburbs, many panhandlers were found at major intersections and at Metro
train stations, but the vast majority of panhandlers were located inside the
city, asking "for 'spare change' in Georgetown, Dupont Circle, Adams-Morgan,
Capitol Hill, and along commercial K and F streets." Id. The 1990 census
indicated that there were 4,813 homeless persons in Washington, D.C., a city
with a total population of 606,900, or 7.93 homeless individuals per 1000 city
residents. Robert Collier, Everybody's Problem: How Cities Around the Coun-
try Are Dealing With the Homeless, S.F. CHRON., July 5, 1992, at ZI. Advocacy
groups for the homeless, however, estimate Washington D.C.'s homeless pop-
ulation at in excess of 10,000. Id. Frustrated and tired, city residents felt
overwhelmed, lacking confidence that city officials and police officers could
protect them from aggressive panhandling. Id.
In addition to the sheer number of panhandlers on the city streets, police
were confronted with a growing number of reported incidents of violent crimes
involving panhandlers. One of the most serious incidents involved an attack
on Angelo Pace, the owner of Anna Maria's restaurant near Dupont Circle,
whose jaw was broken by a panhandler who refused to move away from his
front door, followed him inside and attacked him. Id. As a result of this and
numerous other attacks on citizens, the D.C. City Council enacted the Pan-
handling Control Act of 1993, emergency legislation designed directly to address
and to punish aggressive panhandling. Morenike Efuntade, Panhandlers Warned
in Leaflets; New D.C. Law Bars Aggressive Behavior, Blocking Doorways,
WASH. POST, June 16, 1993, at C3. This new law prohibited aggressive
panhandling, defined as: "continually begging after a person has made a
negative response; touching someone without his consent or speaking to or
following a person in a manner that would cause that person to fear bodily
harm"; and blocking public doorways. Id.; see also East Brooks Books, 48
F.3d at 222 (noting that the Memphis City Council utilized studies of the
impact of sexually oriented businesses on other cities in reaching its conclusion
that legislative action was warranted to address the secondary effects of the
proliferation of sexually oriented businesses within the city); World Famous
Dudley's Food & Spirits, Inc. v. City of College Park, 458 S.E.2d 823, 825
(Ga. 1995) (noting that City of College Park-based ordinance prohibiting nudity
in establishments where alcoholic beverages were served relied primarily upon
secondary effects gleaned from "experiences" of other cities including Austin,
Texas and Indianapolis, Indiana).
198. Significantly, in Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329 (9th
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It is also of utmost importance that the studies obtained from
these cities contain statistics regarding the incidence of street crime
and the amount of revenue before and after their panhandling
ordinances go into effect.199 These statistics will be crucial if the city
is to make the required cause and effect showing to justify the
ordinance as a content-neutral restriction on speech. Finally, once
these studies and statistics have been obtained, the city should in-
corporate them into the legislative history and refer to them often. 200
Incorporating the studies and statistics will inform reviewing courts
of the ordinance's clear and unequivocal constitutional purpose-to
restrict aggressive panhandling based upon the effects that it has on
the community as a whole, and not upon the individual listener-a
purpose totally unrelated to the restriction of free expression in a
public forum.
2. Re-drafting the Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance to Include
All Solicitations
Of course, the city could simply amend the ordinance to eliminate
the distinction between aggressive panhandlers and other solicitors
for money. This is precisely the remedy suggested by the United
States District Court for the District of Maryland.20' This solution
would certainly remove the ordinance from the realm of equal
Cir. 1987), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck
down a municipal ordinance prohibiting the location of adult-oriented busi-
nesses within one thousand feet of residential land and other business and
recreational establishments. The court applied the three-part Renton test and
concluded that the ordinance at issue failed its third prong, which required
reasonable alternative avenues of communication. Id. at 1332. Significantly,
the court noted that the municipality had failed to establish that it relied upon
"evidence permitting the reasonable inference that, absent such limitations, the
adult theaters would have harmful secondary effects." Id. at 1333 (citing City
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986)). Of course, the
problem in Patton was the Baltimore City Council's failure to allege and
substantiate the existence of sufficiently compelling secondary effects. See supra
text accompanying notes 183-85.
199. See East Brooks Books v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995)
(justifying, with statistics, licensing and zoning scheme as a content-neutral
restriction of speech).
200. If the City Council fails to take this crucial step, the result will be identical
to that in Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernadino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.
1987) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting adult oriented businesses
within one thousand feet of specified areas because municipality failed to
establish reliance on evidence that such businesses would have harmful second-
ary effects on the community without such an ordinance).
201. Patton, Civil No. S 90-345, at 67 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 1994) (memorandum
opinion).
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protection challenge, but may in the long run subject the ordinance
to serious challenge under the First Amendment.
As previously noted, Supreme Court precedent requires cities
and municipalities to walk a fine line when enacting content-based
ordinances restricting speech in public fora. 20 2 Once content-neutrality
is lost, measures regulating protected speech could run afoul of the
Constitution on two analytically distinct grounds: by restricting too
little speech and by prohibiting too much speech. 203
The district court's remedy would be of little help unless the
ordinance were accepted as content-neutral. Although eliminating the
distinction between aggressive panhandlers and other solicitors for
money would indeed place the ordinance on more solid equal pro-
tection footing, it would also have the undesirable effect of broad-
ening the ordinance's scope with regard to the First Amendment.
The ordinance would then apply to all aggressive solicitation for
money, a classification that would sweep within its purview political
solicitors, professional fund raisers, and individuals soliciting for
non-profit charitable organizations. The Supreme Court has explicitly
recognized that each of these individuals enjoys a First Amendment
right to solicit in public, subject to appropriate restrictions on the
time, place, and manner of solicitation. 2° Broadening the ordinance's
scope would not address the problems associated with the lack of
content-neutrality. 20 Therefore, if the city follows the district court's
advice, the city will be stuck with an ordinance prohibiting all
aggressive solicitations in a traditional public forum, which will
require judicial analysis under a strict scrutiny test by virtue of its
content-based approach.
If a court engages in a strict scrutiny analysis, there is little
chance that the amended ordinance's fortune would be any better
than that of its predecessor. If the city could not make the required
202. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S.
Ct. 2038 (1994).
203. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. at 2043.
204. Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1993);
see also infra Part III. A.
205. After all, the ordinance was enacted to combat the particular evils associated
with aggressive solicitation by panhandlers and other homeless individuals. See
Patton, No. 90-345, at 5 (citing SECuRrrY TASK FORCE REPORT at 11). Broad-
ening the ordinance to encompass all aggressive solicitation would make the
secondary effects rationale much harder to justify on the basis of empirical
data, i.e. data indicating the "evils" associated with aggressive political or
charitable solicitation. Furthermore, there are statutes on the books that could
be used to address the fraud and deceit concerns that are paramount when
dealing with political or charitable solicitors that can be easily adapted to
address the problem of aggressive panhandling by homeless individuals. See
MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. §§ 6-601 to -620 (1992 & Supp. 1994).
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showing that panhandling is inherently more intimidating than other
types of solicitations for money, then, surely, there would be no way
that the city could show that aggressive political and charitable
solicitation is inherently more intimidating than other types of ag-
gressive solicitations for money. In addition, under the Supreme
Court's forum-based analysis, ordinances restricting or prohibiting
political expression in a public forum are subjected to the most
exacting degree of judicial scrutiny possible. 2°0 Very few, if any,
ordinances will survive this degree of scrutiny. 20 7
Further, by amending the ordinance in this manner, the city will
have all but sacrificed any use of the Renton secondary effects
approach. The Renton approach is the city's best chance to show
that the ordinance is, in fact, content-neutral and that the ordinance
should be examined under the more relaxed time, place, and manner
analysis. If only aggressive panhandling were prohibited, the city
could gather sufficient empirical data indicating the direct and indirect
threat and danger that aggressive panhandling presents to Baltimore,
its citizens, its tourists, and its economic base. However, if political
and charitable solicitation were also prohibited, the city would then
also have to show the inherent threats and dangers associated with
those activities in order to avoid the conclusion that the ordinance
is content-based. Few, if any, courts will be willing to take the
Renton analysis this far. As a result, the ordinance will have lost its
distinctive narrow tailoring, and the city will be left to defend a
hopelessly overbroad ordinance against First Amendment attack. In
essence, the ordinance will fare no better than the overbroad statutes
in Loper and Blair.
V. CONCLUSION
Restrictions on begging and panhandling are the most recent in
a long line of legislative enactments regulating the activities of private
individuals to be challenged in the state and federal courts. Cities
and metropolitan areas have struggled to find an appropriate way to
ensure public safety and to maintain public order in the face of ever-
growing numbers of homeless on their streets-one that will balance
the interests of society and the rights and privileges of the individual.
However, as a result of Patton v. City of Baltimore, Baltimore's
truly innovative and humanitarian approach cannot be enforced until
the city re-drafts its Aggressive Panhandling Ordinance and broadens
the realm of activities that could fall within its purview. Rather than
206. See ISKCON v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701, 2703-04 (1992).
207. Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1857 (1992) ("[A] law rarely survives
[strict] scrutiny .... ").
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taking this drastic approach, the city should explore alternative
methods for correcting the ordinance's constitutional deficiency, par-
ticularly the secondary effects approach outlined by the Supreme
Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. The United States
District Court for the District of Maryland rejected the Renton
approach, in Patton, because there was a dearth of empirical data
linking aggressive panhandling to the harmful secondary effects as-
serted by the city and because of the city's poor choice of secondary
effects. The court did not, therefore, foreclose the city's use of the
secondary effects option completely; rather, it merely objected to
how the city used the option in that instance. The Renton approach
is the best for Baltimore to employ in order to avoid being thrust
into an inescapable constitutional thicket, while simultaneously at-
tempting to balance the ever-conflicting interests of society and the
individual.
William L. Mitchell, II
